This brief examines two issues of current interest concerning inflation: (1) whether "wellanchored" expectations will help to restrain inflation's decline and whether an "un-anchoring" of expectations could lead to undesirably high inflation and (2) to what extent output (or utilization) gaps are useful components of empirical models of inflation and, if they are useful, to what extent current gaps might counterbalance the effect of expectations on inflation. The goals of conducting this examination are to articulate a reasonably coherent framework for the discussion, highlight the key areas of uncertainty, and provide new empirical evidence that sheds some light on these areas.
Executive Summary
In current discussions regarding the likely trajectory of inflation, two concepts loom large: (1) whether "well-anchored" expectations will help to restrain inflation's decline and whether an "un-anchoring" of expectations could lead to undesirably high inflation; and (2) to what extent output (or utilization) gaps are useful components of empirical models of inflation and, if they are useful, to what extent current gaps might counterbalance the effect of expectations on inflation. This brief examines these issues from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, with the goals of articulating a reasonably coherent framework for the discussion, highlighting the key areas of uncertainty, and providing new empirical evidence that sheds some light on these areas.
On the theoretical side, the brief argues that in structural models of inflation that highlight the importance of expectations and monetary policy, the currently low level of real marginal costthe primary driver of inflation in such models-acts as a powerful downward force on inflation, even when expectations are well anchored in the sense that the public understands the central bank's firm commitment to a specific numerical inflation objective. The result is that, under conditions that approximate current economic conditions, inflation falls for a period in such models. The extent to which it falls, however, and the length of the period over which it returns to the target, depend importantly on the way expectations are formed.
The next section considers alternative ways of characterizing the expectations that may influence inflation. The alternatives include "rational" or model-consistent expectations, backward-looking expectations, and two survey measures of expectations that reflect shorterand longer-horizon forecasts of inflation. Over the past 30 years, the evidence on the roles that these expectations alternatives play in influencing inflation is far from air-tight. However, a few patterns emerge. First, putting exclusive weight on model-consistent expectations seems fairly strongly at odds with the data. Second, the role of simple backward-looking expectations appears to have declined in recent years. Third, the influence of the survey measures appears to have increased in recent years. All of these results should be taken with a grain of salt, because the period for which we have such data is also the "Great Moderation" period, and the relative tranquility of this period (the past two years notwithstanding) poses significant challenges for uncovering the determinants of inflation.
The brief considers the implications of the empirical results on expectations for current circumstances. Because the survey measures (both long-and short-horizon) adjust quite sluggishly to conditions, including recent inflation, a greater influence of these variables would act to dampen the movements of inflation in both directions. That is, with marginal cost and output gaps both far from their norms, sluggish survey measures may act to slow the downward movement of inflation. Of course, this also implies sluggishness in the gradual upward recovery of inflation towards the Fed's implicit inflation goal.
Finally, we examine some evidence on the effects of output and unemployment gaps on inflation. Consistent with results in Stock and Watson (2009) , we show that in more tranquil periods the benefit provided to inflation forecasts by such measures is marginal at best.
However, in periods characterized by larger gaps-for example, an unemployment rate that is more than 1.5 percentage points from its estimated (time-varying) NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment)-the improvement afforded by including such measures is considerable.
I. Introduction
In almost all models of inflation, the expectations of private agents about future inflation play an important role in determining current inflation. In older-style Phillips curves of the type canonized in Robert Gordon's (1982) "triangle model," expectations were implicitly captured via the lags of inflation, which proxied for an autoregressive or (loosely speaking) adaptive expectations process. In more recent models, private agents form rational expectations of future inflation that are consistent with the model's structure. For example, in the so-called New- If the path of expected output matters for determining inflation, then by implication so does the path of expected funds rates, which in turn depends on the path of future inflation (and output), as well as on the path of the inflation target. This schematic model captures most of the focal points in the discussion about inflation and its determinants of the past 25 years. This brief examines the role in determining inflation of output, inflation expectations-rational or notand of the time-varying inflation target.
II. The balance between "anchored" expectations and marginal cost pressures in a structural model
In recent discussions of the outlook for inflation, many have referred to the importance of "well- target. The time-varying target is assumed to follow a random walk-that is, the level of the target is very persistent, but changes in the target are unpredictable:
In recent years, it would seem that the amount of time variation in the inflation target has declined considerably. 4
3 Because of very rapid productivity growth and decelerating wage growth, the 2009: Q4 reading for the four-quarter change in real unit labor cost for the nonfarm business sector was -5.7, the lowest reading since 1983, a period of substantial disinflation.
This likely owes in part to the more transparent stance of the Fed in recent decades. In a simple case, if the inflation goal is fixed, then the presence of well-anchored expectations in such a rational expectations model simply means that the private agents know the fixed inflation goal and understand the implications of monetary policy for the future course of output. This does not imply that inflation will be constant or that expectations will be constant. But it does imply that expectations will correspond directly to the underlying fundamentals in the model. In this model in which expectations can become un-anchored, we can examine how much wellanchored expectations can offset the effect of declining marginal cost, and whether an adverse change in the public's view of the Fed's inflation goal could lead to undesirably high inflation.
In the simulation of the model that follows, we start the economy at a quarterly level of real marginal cost that is well below its equilibrium, reflective of recent readings for this series (see footnote 3 above). The output gap begins at -2 percent, which is qualitatively consistent with such low readings for marginal cost, but is still a modest gap given most current estimates. The inflation rate begins at 2 percent, above its current value, and the true inflation target is 2 percent. The federal funds rate is at its long-run equilibrium, the sum of the long-run real interest rate and the inflation goal. Given these starting conditions, the model then determines the evolution of inflation, the funds rate, marginal cost, and output. 8 Of course, this is an optimistic starting point relative to current conditions, as inflation today is lower than the implicit goal of the Fed, and despite uncertainty about the size of the output gap, it is not likely that it is currently as small as -2 percent. 9 Lowering the initial values for inflation and the output gap would, of course, lower the trajectory for inflation and support the points below even more strongly. 10 7 See Barnes, Gumbau-Brisa, Lie, and Olivei (2009) for empirical evidence bearing on this point. 8 Marginal cost is linked to output in a way consistent with the simple derivation described in footnote 3, but allowing for a gradual adjustment to movements in output: The data suggest a relationship between real marginal cost and the output gap that is described in the preceding footnote. 10 The shocks to marginal cost and output at the beginning of the simulations do not persist into subsequent periods. The model's own propagation mechanisms account for the dynamics displayed in the figures.
The simulations are revealing. In the baseline simulation (Figure 1 ), we assume a degree of indexation that is consistent with a standard "hybrid" model of inflation that mixes both forward-looking and backward-looking (indexation) influences. 11 In the baseline, there is no misperception about the Fed's inflation goal. Despite initially very well anchored inflation expectations, the pull of depressed marginal cost on inflation is significant. Inflation drops well below zero, the federal funds rate is pinned at the zero lower bound for about two years, and inflation only gradually regains levels consistent with the Fed's target. Again, this simulation is decidedly optimistic, in the sense that it assumes that most of the decline in output is matched by a decline in potential, and the model reflects no financial disruption during the recession.
Both would serve to further depress output, inflation, and the policy rate. But the simulation serves to illustrate an important qualitative point: Even if one places no faith in the gap, the enormous decline in (the proxy for) marginal cost acts as a powerful pull on inflation even in the presence of perfectly anchored expectations. 12 In the next simulation (Figure 2 ), the public initially believes that the Fed's inflation target has risen to 3 percent, shown in the dashed red line in the figure. Over time, the public will adjust its perception of the target downward in line with observed inflation. But at first, this misperception keeps inflation from falling as much as it does in the baseline simulation, as price-setters expect a higher rate of trend inflation. As a consequence, the funds rate does not have to fall as far, but it is still the case that on net, inflation falls well below zero for an extended period, and the funds rate remains well below its equilibrium for several years. Thus, in the model with significant indexation, these unanchored expectations, while important, do not nearly offset the downward pressure on inflation that arises from depressed marginal costs.
The next figure ( Figure 3 ) considers a simulation in which there is no indexation in the economy, and thus no backward-looking inertia imparted to the inflation rate from this source. 11 The coefficients ρ  and 1 b in equation (1.5) are estimated using conventional techniques over the post-1984 sample.
In this case, the overall disruption from the sharp drop in marginal cost is less severe: Inflation declines, to be sure, dropping below one percent for a while, but after about three years it has risen close to the target. The required decline in the federal funds rate is noticeably less.
Under the same model assumptions, but allowing for the same misperception about the inflation goal as in Figure 2 , the inflation rate still declines, but is below target by less than a percentage point and only for a fairly short time (Figure 4 ). The federal funds rate dips below its long-run equilibrium for a bit, but because of the very forward-looking, flexible nature of the economy in this model, the increase in the perceived inflation goal offsets most of the downward pressure on inflation from marginal cost.
From these simulations, we offer the following conclusions:
• No matter the degree of indexation in the model, even with perfectly anchored expectations, inflation is likely to fall in a recession characterized by the decline in marginal cost (or the output gap) that we have seen to date.
• How much it falls, and how much monetary accommodation is required (and for how long) is critically dependent on the degree of indexation or "backward-lookingness" that characterizes inflation. In a very-forward-looking model, the decline in inflation may well be modest.
• To date, the evidence on the persistence of inflation that bears on the degree of indexation in this model is still mixed. Fuhrer (2009) examines a wide array of evidence for recent samples and concludes that it would be risky to assume no persistence in inflation for the United States, even in recent years. While persistence is likely to have declined relative to the 1970s and 1980s, it probably remains a feature of inflation in the United States. Thus, one should probably give some weight to a model with some indexation. In these circumstances, well-anchored expectations do not prevent serious downward pressure on inflation. Correspondingly, expectations that become unanchored on the upside do not offset much of the downward pressure on inflation.
Because the way expectations are formed and the degree of backward-lookingness in the model matter importantly for how much expectations can offset the effects of marginal cost or output, the next section examines empirically the influence of various expectations concepts, including rational expectations, over the past 30 years.
III. What kind of expectations influence inflation? An empirical assessment
The expectations in the models described above are not observed in the same way as the federal funds rate, inflation, and output are. In the economics literature of recent decades, this unobservability has been circumvented by assuming "rational expectations"; the expectations of interest are, in essence, the forecasts of the model in which they are embedded. 13 But if the model fails to capture important aspects of the economic environment, then the rational or model-consistent expectations may not represent well the expectations of real-world economic actors. Alternatively, economists may wish to examine more direct measures of inflation expectations to see how robust the conclusions from rational expectations models are to different assumptions about expectations. Finally, much recent commentary has focused on the stability (or lack thereof) in more direct measures of inflation expectations, positing that well-anchored expectations may preclude a drop in inflation such as those that have followed other significant postwar recessions. For any of these reasons, one may turn to proxies for expectations, such as the forecasts of professionals, surveys of households or businesses, or the expectations embedded in financial market prices. 14 In this section, we use survey-based measures of inflation expectations to obtain another measure of the importance of expectations in determining inflation. We run a "horse race" in a simple inflation equation, allowing four different proxies for inflation expectations to determine inflation. In addition to output or marginal cost, inflation is allowed to depend on:
1. Lagged inflation-here we employ the four-quarter moving average of inflation, .6) below. 15 Figure 5 displays the data for the two SPF forecasts, along with the core CPI and PCE inflation measures. Note that the 10-year SPF forecast has hovered very close to 2.5 percent since the late 1990s. This remarkable stability in the 10-year forecast is somewhat suspect to us. Recall that this is the median forecast for the average inflation rate over the ensuing 10 years. As with a 10-year bond, its longer maturity implies that it will be less responsive to near-term conditions than a one-year forecast. But it would be unusual for a 10-year forecast (or a 10-year bond) to remain within 10 basis points of a single value for over a decade. If the Fed had persuaded the public that its inflation goal were 2.5 percent, then the one-year inflation expectation 10 years hence could well remain fixed at 2.5 percent. But the rationale for a fixed median of 10-year average forecasts is much harder to come by. The one-year SPF forecast, which, like the 10-year, is plotted as of its forecast date, fluctuates considerably and tracks current inflation reasonably well. 15 The University of Michigan one-year-ahead inflation expectation displays very similar properties to the SPF. In initial estimation testing, the differences between the Michigan and SPF forecasts were not qualitatively significant. The SPF 10-year expectation is the only consistently collected measure of longer-term inflation forecasts that is readily available. With more time, researchers will likely use the inflation expectations implied by the yields on TIPS, but at present, only a 10-year sample is available.
The contribution of these four measures to current inflation is constrained to sum to one, roughly in keeping with an accelerationist Phillips curve. We further allow for the influence of important changes in the relative price of oil. The estimating equation is thus But it seems a useful benchmark for assessing the empirical contributions of various expectations measures. 16 We estimate the equation using a standard Bayesian estimator for rolling samples of 10 years, beginning in 1983 and extending through 1999: Q3. 17
Prior distributions
The priors for the key parameters are as listed in the following These priors smooth the estimates somewhat in the presence of large shocks, but with relatively large standard errors, they allow the data to be the primary influence on the estimates. Note that the prior on 3 µ allows for some probability mass below zero, reflecting our somewhat more diffuse prior about the role of the one-year survey expectation in determining inflation. 16 For example, the way in which many theories would suggest that the 10-year expectation should enter a structural inflation model, the overlap between the indexation term and the inertial one-and 10-year surveys, and so on, are left as incompletely specified in the empirical specification. 17 Increasing the sample window to 15 years produces somewhat smoother, but qualitatively similar, results.
For example, the one-year survey could serve as a correction to the model-consistent expectation, which might entail a non-positive coefficient. Similarly, the implicit prior on the 10-year survey expectation spans a considerably larger region (from -2 to 1.5), reflecting the less theoretically grounded role for this long-term expectation in the canonical inflation equation.
The priors on the indexation and rational expectation terms are a bit tighter, as theory suggests they should fall between zero and one.
With the presence of rational expectations for inflation in period t+1, the model implicitly requires expectations of the output gap (and/or marginal cost), as well as expectations for the one-year and 10-year SPF expectations. For output and the federal funds rate, we include unconstrained (VAR) equations in output, the funds rate, and inflation. The intercepts for these equations are allowed to change for each sample period. We link marginal cost to output as in the section above. Finally, we model the one-and 10-year inflation expectations as moving averages of recent inflation, with moving average parameters estimated from the data. That is,
we specify the one-and 10-year inflation expectations as (1.7)
This specification provides a reasonable one-step-ahead forecast for these measures, and also ensures that the expectations measures will converge to the inflation goal in the steady state. 18 i λ Note that the coefficients , which index the degree of inertia in the survey expectations, are estimated to be in the range of 0.8 to 0.96, implying significant inertia in these expectations, a feature to which we return below. Finally, we allow for an intercept shift in the SPF 10-year expectation, to reflect its stubborn insistence on remaining at 2.5 percent despite experience over the past 10 years during which inflation averaged about 2 percent, and the Fed's not- 18 These equations matter only to the extent that the weight on 1 t π + differs from zero, in which case the model will compute expectations of the 1-and 10-year surveys in computing the solution for current inflation. In examining the determinants of the survey expectations in the data for the full sample, two clear features emerge: (1) Both the 1-year and 10-year expectations are well modeled as slowly-moving moving averages of past inflation; and (2) The influence of other variables on the expectations is of marginal importance economically, and at best fleeting significance statistically.
official inflation goal was widely believed to be about 2 percent. This implies the following modification to equation (1.6), with the intercept shift denoted 10 c : 19 We use the CBO's estimate of potential output and define the gap as 100 times the log difference between real GDP and the CBO potential estimate.
For several points in the overall estimation sample, we estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters to assess the accuracy with which key parameters are estimated at various points in the sample. parameter takes in the purely forward-looking simulation of the first section. In all cases, the estimate places a tiny probability on this value.
3. In the most recent decade, the weight on the 10-year SPF expectation has risen for some, but not all, measures. The most noticeable increase arises for the core CPI with the output gap as the driving variable, Figure 6 . In prior decades, it would have been difficult to reject the hypothesis that the contribution from the 10-year expectation 21 These distributions are derived from estimates for rolling 10-year samples from 1983 to 2009, using the methods described in footnote 22. 22 The posterior is estimated using the now-conventional Markov-chain Monte Carlo method, with a Random-walk Metropolis-Hastings step. 23 In some cases, the posterior distribution differs little from the prior, suggesting that the likelihood (the data) offers little information about the parameter. In the text, we highlight those cases in which this is not true.
was zero. The core PCE model with real marginal cost as the driving variable shows a more modest increase in the weight on the 10-year SPF forecast in the most recent decade.
4. The weight on lagged inflation was particularly high for the core PCE/output gap model in the 1990s.
5. For the CPI models, the one-year SPF forecast has a significant influence on inflation for all of the subsamples. The influence of the one-year forecast is much less evident for the PCE models.
While the shift towards some weight on the long-term expectation for some periods is of interest, it is also important to note that the weight rises at precisely the time when the 10-year forecast "flat-lines" at 2.5 percent. This could be taken as evidence that price-setters have wellanchored expectations, but, as discussed above, one would not expect that well-anchored expectations would manifest themselves as a constant forecast for the 10-year average inflation rate.
A key part of the debate over the determination of inflation is the role played by the output gap or marginal cost. Figure 10 provides some evidence bearing on this question. It displays the distribution of the estimated parameter on the output gap or marginal cost ( γ ) for the four models discussed above. In general, the estimated parameter is small, ranging from 0.02 to 0.06 across the decades, but in most cases, its accuracy has improved in the past decade. The data generally reject the null that the parameter is zero. Typically only about 5 percent of the estimated parameter's distribution lies to the left of 0.01.
For the periods when the 10-year expectation is given near-zero weight, so that 
IV. The balance of expectations and marginal cost pressures in a survey-expectations-based model
The results in the preceding section suggest that inflation is not well characterized by a purely forward-looking model, and these results appear to favor putting some weight on the survey expectations (as well as on lagged inflation). Thus, it is of interest to revisit the simulation of a model that uses survey expectations as the key expectation variable in an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We conduct a simulation like the one discussed in Section II, but instead of rational expectations, we now use a model that is consistent with the estimated influence of survey expectations from the preceding section.
In particular, we assume that the influence of the longer-term inflation expectation primarily reflects the influence of trend inflation, and we model trend inflation as in Section II (it represents the very slow-moving inflation target of the Fed). We allow the one-year survey expectation to influence current inflation in lieu of the model-consistent expectation. Thus, the inflation equation becomes SPF expectation is also expressed in deviations form
which simply makes the deviation of the one-year expectation from the inflation trend a moving average of past deviations of actual inflation from the inflation trend. As suggested in Figure 5 and discussed in footnote 18, the one-year SPF forecast is well modeled as a slowly moving average of current and recent inflation realizations. Thus, for this exercise, we set ω to twothirds, which implies a slightly more rapid response to recent inflation than what we find in the data. 25 Figure 15 shows the response to the same large marginal cost shock for this survey expectations model, with a shock to the public's perceptions of the Fed's inflation goal. 26 25 The estimates of the process for the one-year forecast are performed on the raw, rather than detrended data. However, the trend inflation rate is presumed to move quite slowly, so that its contribution to the short-run movements of the one-year forecast will generally be small. The significant downward pressure exerted by below-equilibrium marginal cost is partly offset by the rather slow downward progress of the one-year inflation expectation. This anchoring limits the decline in inflation to a minimum of 0.7 in the second year of the simulation. But this same anchoring also slows the progress of inflation upward towards its (unchanged) goal of 2 percent. While inflation has risen to 1 percent by the end of the simulation, it takes several more years to reach its goal. To be sure, monetary policy could act more aggressively with the funds rate in this simulation (if not in the real world). But the qualitative point of the simulation is clear: to the extent that inflation of late has become more closely associated with slow-moving expectations like those reflected in the SPF measures, this may limit the downward trajectory of inflation somewhat. But it will also likely slow upward progress towards its long-run goal. 27
V. Activity gaps and inflation dynamics
The inflation models and the related simulations considered in the previous section hinge on activity gaps (or real marginal costs) being the driving process for inflation. Absent such a link from activity to inflation, these models have no content. There is now a large literature on the performance of inflation forecasts based on activity gaps (that is, Phillips curve representations of inflation dynamics) relative to univariate benchmarks. Recent work by Stock and Watson (2009) surveys the literature and provides a comprehensive analysis of Phillips curve forecasts of inflation vis-à-vis good univariate benchmark models. The conclusion reached by Stock and Watson after examining a wide array of (backward-looking) Phillips curve specifications is that the link from activity gaps to inflation is not always present. Inflation is difficult to forecast, and Phillips curve-based forecasts of inflation outperform univariate benchmarks only sporadically.
Stock and Watson, however, note that the episodes when activity-based forecasts outperform univariate forecasts have in common a large activity gap, either positive or negative.
The point that large activity gaps may contain information for inflation forecasting is illustrated in Figure 16 . The figure compares inflation forecast errors based on a standard backward-looking Phillips curve with the forecast errors based on a random walk model of inflation.
Specifically, the Phillips curve model takes the form
where 4 4 t π + denotes the four-quarter-ahead rate of inflation, t π is the one-quarter (annualized) rate of inflation, t u  is the unemployment rate gap, t z is a vector of supply shocks, and 4 4 t υ + is an error term. As usual, the sum of the coefficients on the lags of inflation is constrained to sum to unity. In the random walk model of inflation, the four-quarter-ahead rate of inflation is equal to the rate of inflation over the most recent four quarters plus an error term:
( 2.2)
The figure shows on the horizontal axis the difference between the absolute value of the forecast error for four-quarter-ahead core PCE inflation based on the Phillips curve, and the absolute value of the forecast error of four-quarter-ahead core PCE inflation when the inflation forecast is given by the most recent historical value of four-quarter core PCE inflation. A negative value on the horizontal axis implies that the Phillips curve-based forecast is more accurate than the random walk univariate forecast, and vice versa. The variable on the vertical axis is the absolute value of the unemployment rate gap, that is, the absolute value of the difference between the unemployment rate and an estimated measure of the NAIRU. Each dot in the figure represents a different quarter, and the period we consider is 1961: Q1 to the present. It is apparent from the figure that when the unemployment rate gap is small, there is little to suggest that the Phillips curve inflation forecasts are better than the random walk forecasts, as there are roughly as many points to the left as there are to the right of the vertical axis. It is only when the gap starts to become large in absolute value that there is a tendency for the points to be located to the left of the vertical axis, implying that Phillips curve-based forecasts are more accurate than random walk forecasts.
The Phillips curve based-forecasts embedded in Figure 16 are in-sample. Stock and Watson, instead, work with out-of-sample forecasts. Moreover, they consider a variety of activity gapbased specifications for modeling inflation, a different estimate for the time-varying NAIRU than the one we are using, and a more sophisticated univariate forecast-though not materially different in terms of forecast outcomes-than the simple random walk upon which this exercise is based. Still, their evidence is broadly similar to the one depicted in the figure. Indeed, Stock
and Watson sum up their results as indicating that when the unemployment rate gap exceeds 1.5 percentage points in absolute value, the Phillips curve forecasts "improve substantially" (p.
146) upon the univariate model.
These findings are consistent with potential nonlinearities in the Phillips curve. Consider the following modification to a standard backward-looking Phillips curve
3)
The modification to the standard linear setup in (2.1) allows the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment to change as a function of the level of the unemployment rate gap. While there is uncertainty about the extent of activity gaps in many circumstances, the most recent reading of the unemployment rate at 9.9 percent in April 2010 should place the unemployment rate gap well above the 1.5 threshold that seems to make knowledge of the gap useful for forecasting inflation. More debatable is the extent of the downward pressure that such a gap will exert on inflation. As the previous sections show, this will depend importantly on how inflation expectations are formed. Too, it will depend on the size of the gap and the slope of the Phillips curve. In this respect, it is interesting to assess the performance of a simple threshold Phillips curve model of inflation in the current situation. 
VI. Conclusions
Given the difficulties in modeling inflation, especially over the past decade when inflation has been relatively tranquil, and the economy-up until 2007-was similarly placid by historical standards, we should be hesitant to draw any conclusions too firmly.
That said, the analysis presented in this paper points to some tentative conclusions about inflation and its likely trajectory over the coming years:
1. With all of the models discussed in this paper, the current configuration of output gaps (however poorly estimated) and marginal cost suggest that inflation is likely to remain low, perhaps declining, and below the Federal Reserve's implicit goal for several years.
2. Within more formal models of inflation, apart from the extreme position of a purely forward-looking model, there are significant downside risks to inflation, even if expectations are very well anchored.
3. Evidence on the influence of survey measures of inflation expectations on current inflation suggests that model-consistent expectations have not reflected well the expectations that have influenced CPI or PCE inflation over the past three decades. The effect of lagged inflation has been large at times, but appears to have declined in recent years.
4. Expectations that are well proxied by slow-moving survey expectations appear to have had some influence over the decades, and, for some models, that influence has increased recently.
5. In a model that substitutes slow-moving survey expectations measures for modelconsistent expectations, the forecast for the near term envisions a decline in inflation that is somewhat more muted. In this sense, the risks to more pronounced disinflation could be mitigated by well-anchored inflation expectations. Correspondingly, however, the time required for inflation to rise to its FOMC-determined goal will be quite long.
6. While there are numerous issues surrounding the measurement and definition of the output or unemployment gap that sits at the center of many inflation models, evidence in this paper is consistent with that of Stock and Watson (2009) . Both they and we find that in periods characterized by what appear to be large output gaps (such as the current period), gaps are important predictors of inflation.
7. Altogether, these observations suggest that, across a fairly wide array of inflation frameworks, one would expect inflation to decline in the near term. Precisely how much depends on key parameters of the model, about which we must admit a fair amount of uncertainty. But one extreme among the alternative inflation models-a purely forwardlooking model with little effect from inertial variables, such as the one depicted in Figures 3 and 4-appears to be significantly at odds with the data. It could be risky to count too much on the implications of such a framework. Distribution of parameter estimates Core CPI, output gap, "trend inflation" model Figure 12 Distribution of estimated parameters Core CPI/Marginal cost, "trend inflation" model
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